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In this article we conduct a processual analysis to assess evidence and test the 
following hypothesis: that the complicated architecture and processes of national 
defense planning, programming, budgeting and execution and the defense acquisition 
decision system lead to unintended and negative consequences for defense acquisition 
and procurement. The purpose of this article is to identify key points of linkage 
weakness or failure between DoD financial management and acquisition decision 
systems. We first describe the PPB system and decision process. We then provide an 
analysis of recent changes to PPB. Next, we describe the defense acquisition system 
(DAS) in detail. This leads us, by drawing on interview data, to identify systems linkages 
and areas of misalignment between the PPBES and the DAS.  Finally, we provide 
conclusions with respect to our hypothesis, analysis of consequent key problems and 
issues, and areas that require further research. 
We find that the warfighting-needs system, the acquisition system (DAS), and the 
PPBE system focus around various points of integration and articulation—from an 
assessment of the threat in the SPG to a design for joint capabilities in the JPG through 
the POM building process and into the annual budget preparation and review 
processes. Most, if not all, of the top leaders in the DoD hold multiple responsibilities in 
these systems. While formal documents provide for co-ordination, some co-ordination 
happens by forcing decisions on different aspects of defense needs through the same 
sets of players. Formal documents are required and reviewed by these players before 
decisions are made initially and at subsequent important check points, be they 
milestones, POM, or budget decisions. Additionally, staffs of analysts in different 
organizational locales have responsibilities for data production and review in program 
creation, implementation, and execution.  
In addition to the complexity inherent in these systems, we conclude that the 
passage of time itself has important consequences for defense acquisition. Weapon 
systems take time to develop and build. The procurement effort can span multiple 
annual PPBE cycles, be under the influence of a series of layered PPBE decisions and 
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feed data back into any number of current and future PPBE phases. The passage of 
time means that people, resources, and doctrine change. These are all threats to the 
orderly integration of the warfighting requirements, DAS and PPBES.   
Some operators in the process expressed concerns and frustrations with the 
outcomes produced by the DAS and the PPBE system. These ranged from process 
duplications, repetitious calculations of program costs by different staffs, inflated budget 
estimates for programs and concerns about the efficiency of the concurrent program- 
and budget-review processes. Research is underway to evaluate how valid these 
concerns are. We suggest that one way to improve the acquisition process is to change 
the budget process to a multi-year format; we believe this might reduce end-of-year 
turbulence and churn and allow for greater rationalization of DoD decision-making 
systems.  Finally, we conclude that the major challenge facing the DoD in the period 
2004-2008 and beyond is how to continue to modernize the fighting forces and continue 
the pace of business transformation while paying the high price of waging the War on 
Terrorism. In essence, what the DoD must fund and support in the short-term must be 
traded-off against longer-term investments to improve both business-management 
efficiency and force readiness. Given this dilemma, it is clear that DoD leadership faces 
severe challenges in the next decade.
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 7, 2001, in testimony before Congress, Comptroller General David 
Walker testified that the United States Department of Defense was the best in the world 
in its primary mission—that of warfighting; but, in the same testimony, Walker assigned 
the DoD a failing grade in economy and efficiency: “At the same point in time, the 
Department of Defense is a D plus as it relates to economy and efficiency.”  Walker 
continued, “the acquisitions process is fundamentally broken, the contracts process has 
got problems, and logistics as well” (McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p. 335). The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that the Department of Defense 
(DoD) had spent $146 billion in developing and acquiring weapons in 2004. Moreover, 
the GAO warned that, as a result of inefficient systems and practices, the DoD invited a 
series of troubling outcomes: “Weapon systems routinely take much longer to field, cost 
more to buy, and require more support than provided for in investment plans” (GAO, 
2005a, p. 68).  GAO staff observed: 
For example, programs move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule 
estimates, lack clearly defined and stable requirements, use immature 
technologies in launching product development, and fail to solidify design and 
manufacturing processes at appropriate junctures in development. As a result, 
wants are not always distinguished from needs, problems often surface late in 
the development process, and fixes tend to be more costly than if caught earlier. 
(GAO, 2005a, p. 68) 
Defense acquisition has long been beset by problems related to both politics and 
efficiency. Numerous reforms since the 1950s have attempted to improve the 
acquisition process. Recent reforms including more open competition, streamlined 
acquisition procedures, elimination of obsolete regulations and more effective program 
management are some of the substantial changes made in the DoD in the last ten years 
to improve acquisition budgeting and management. Establishing open competition also 
is a significant part of recent acquisition transformation initiatives. Changes in 
acquisition information technology (resulting from the passage of the Clinger-Cohen 
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Act), the use of cost as an independent variable as a means of reducing acquisition 
costs, and spiral acquisition practices are other changes expected to yield positive 
results. 
Congressional and DoD transformation initiatives under Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld have focused on greater reliance on commercial products and 
processes and more timely infusion of new technology into new and existing systems. 
Commercial product usage is implemented with an understanding of the complex set of 
impacts that stem from use of commercial off-the-shelf technology (Oberndorf & 
Carney, 1998). Procurement solicitation requirements are written to include 
performance measures. If military specifications are necessary, waivers must first be 
obtained. Solicitations for new acquisitions that cite military specifications typically 
encourage bidders to propose alternatives. The DoD has made significant progress in 
disposing of a portion of its huge inventory of military specifications and standards 
through cancellation, consolidation, conversion to a guidance handbook, and 
replacement with performance specifications and non-government standards.  
Despite all of this change, the primary criticisms of the acquisition process 
remain—that it is too complex, too slow, and too costly (Barr, 2005). In some cases it 
also may produce weapons that are “over-qualified” or irrelevant to the task at hand 
when they are finally put in the field because the threat and warfighting environment 
have changed since acquisition and procurement decisions were made to contract for 
weapons platforms, systems and components. Annual budget cycle procedures and 
politics within the DoD and between the DoD and Congress add complexity, turbulence 
and some degree of confusion to this mix.   
In this article, we conduct a processual analysis (Barzelay, 2003; Barzelay & 
Gallego, 2005) to assess evidence and test the following hypothesis: the complicated 
architecture and processes of national defense planning, programming, budgeting and 
execution and the defense acquisition decision system lead to unintended and negative 
consequences for defense acquisition and procurement. The purpose of this article is to 
identify key points of linkage weakness or failure between DoD financial management 
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and acquisition decision systems. We first describe the PPB system and decision 
process. We then provide an analysis of recent changes to PPB. Next, we describe the 
defense acquisition system (DAS) in detail. This leads us, by drawing on interview data, 
to identify systems linkages and areas of misalignment between the PPBES and the 
DAS. Finally, we provide conclusions with respect to our hypothesis, analysis of 
consequent key problems and issues, and areas that require further research. 
THE DEFENSE FINANCIAL RESOURCE DECISION 
SYSTEM 
For four decades, the Department of Defense has developed resource plans and 
budgets using the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System, or PPBS. This system 
integrates warfighting requirements, the programming for acquisition of assets including 
airplanes, ships, and tanks, and the specification of annual budget amounts needed to 
operate the Department of Defense. These latter amounts are converted in 
appropriation categories and passed along to Congress in the President’s budget. 
Various documents, planning processes and iterations fulfill the mandates of the 
system.  
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system (now PPBES—
see below) is comprised of a series of multistage and multilevel processes that 
cumulatively allow the DoD to determine capability and needs based on strategic 
doctrine. It provides the process for decision making on defense programs required to 
meet deterrence and warfighting demands, and the financing necessary to acquire and 
sustain capability.  The complexities and machinations of the system confound both 
participants and observers.  This is due both to the tangled web of overlapping 
processes that make up the PPBES and to the sheer size of the budget in terms of 
numbers of programs, as well as the amounts of money involved. This is compounded 
by the need to meet a series of deadlines to keep the process on schedule to produce a 
defense budget for the President and Congress. Congressional appropriation 
restrictions also create difficulties in the process because Congress provides money 
differently than the manner in which the DoD budgets (McCaffery & Jones, 2004).   
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In overview, the PPBES consists of four separate sub-systems: planning, 
programming, budgeting and execution. Program and budget review operate roughly 
simultaneously. Program and budget review are shaped by decisions made by DoD 
senior executives in the Strategic Planning Guidance process (SPG) and by the Senior 
Leaders Review Group (SLRG)—chaired by the Secretary of Defense and including 
major players representing the military and DoD leadership. The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs and his staff submit input to the PPBES through the Chairman’s Program 
Recommendation, the Joint Planning Guidance (JPG) and the Chairman’s Program 
Assessment. Combatant Commanders give input through their Integrated Priority Lists 
(IPLs), through conferences and lessons learned and through participation on the 
SLRG. The military services have input specifically in building the Program Objectives 
Memorandum or POM directly, and to the budget through their department secretaries 
and service of their senior leaders on the SLRG. The military services also conduct 
numerous special studies, e.g., by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Program and 
Analysis (PA&E) or by the planning and programming offices within the military 
departments and services. The PPBES features myriad individual planning sub-systems 
and decision making sub-processes, involving a large number of participants, the sum 
of which defies complete description as a coherent system. Figure 1 shows the most 
prominent events and their timing in the period of one calendar year in the PPBES 
decision cycle but excludes budget execution that occurs after Congress and the 





Figure 1. The PPBES Cycle (After Daly, 2004, p. 4) 
The purpose of the PPBES is to provide a systematic and structured approach 
for allocating resources in support of the national security strategy of the US.  The 
ultimate goal of the entire PPBES process is to provide the military Commander-in-
Chiefs with the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within resource 
constraints. Before delving into an analysis of the PPBES, it is necessary to understand 
more about the components of the system. Once we understand how the PPBES 
operates in general, we will then review changes initiated in 2001 and 2003 to 
significantly modify the PPBS into what is now the PPBES—the result of significant 
reforms authorized by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld under the administration of 
President George W. Bush.  
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THE FOUR PHASES OF PPBES  
PPBES has four distinct phases, with each phase overlapping the other (Jones & 
Bixler, 1992, p. 19-31).  
Planning 
The planning phase begins at the Executive Branch level with the President’s 
National Security Strategy (NSS) developed by the National Security Council. The NSS 
receives input from several federal agencies (including the Department of State, the 
Central Intelligence Agency and others in the intelligence community) to ascertain the 
threats to the US in order to form the nation’s overall strategic plan to meet those 
threats, thereby outlining the national defense strategy. Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) produce a fiscally unconstrained document called the National Military 
Strategy Document (NMSD). The NMSD contains their advice regarding strategic 
planning to meet the direction given in the National Security Strategy while addressing 
the military capabilities required to support that objective.  As a follow-on to the NMSD, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) advises the Secretary of Defense, in 
the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) and Joint Planning Guidance (JPG), 
regarding joint capabilities to be realized across DoD military components. The CPR 
provides the personal recommendations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for 
promoting joint readiness, doctrine, and training, and for better satisfying joint 
warfighting requirements to influence formulation of the Joint Planning Guidance. The 
Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) represents key joint staff input from the 
CJCS and his staff into the PPBES process. It is meant to help steer the content and 
decisions that produce the Strategic Planning Guidance. 
All of the above input is provided to the Secretary of Defense for drafting and 
ultimate issuance of the Strategic Planning Guidance, the Future Year Defense Plan, a 
six-year projection of department-wide force structure requirements, and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  The SPG provides the military services official 
guidance regarding force structure and fiscal guidelines for use in preparing their 
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Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) during the programming phase of PPBES. 
For purposes of reporting to Congress on defense planning and programs, the DoD 
transmits the comprehensive Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In the past decade, 
the QDR has enhanced the FYDP and SPG for purposes of planning for the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the DoD.  The purposes and outcomes desired 
from the overall process are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. From the National Security Strategy to Budget Execution (After McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p. 99) 
Programming 
The objective of the programming phase is for each military component to 
produce a Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) to address how each will allocate 
resources over a six-year period. The development of the POM, which is done every 
other year, requires the military services and departments to consider numerous 
issues—including their Commanders-in-Chiefs’ (CINCs) fiscally unconstrained 
Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) stipulating programs that must be addressed during its 
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development.  The POM also must support the guidance given in the SPG and operate 
under fiscal constraints issued within it. The POMs are developed in even-numbered 
years and, subsequently, reviewed in odd-numbered years.  
Woven within the POM are the Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) developed 
by resource sponsors (e.g., the major commands, systems commands and defense 
agencies) to address military service objectives and preferences of the CINCs. The 
SPPs are developed within the constraints of military department and service Total 
Obligation Authority (TOA), defined as the total amount of funds to be available for 
spending in a given year—including new obligation authority and unspent funds from 
prior years. 
Military department and service POMs are reviewed by the JCS to ensure 
compliance with the NMSD, the JPG and SPG. This involves assessing force levels, 
balance, and capabilities.  Following the review, the CJCS issues the Chairman’s 
Program Assessment (CPA) to influence the Secretary of Defense decisions delineated 
in the Program Decision Memoranda (PDM), marking the beginning of the end of the 
programming phase. The Chairman’s Program Assessment is another key steering 
device that the CJCS uses to give his personal assessment of the adequacy and risks 
in military department and service (and defense agency) POMs. The CJCS also 
proposes alternative program recommendations and budget proposals for Secretary of 
Defense consideration prior to the issuance of Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) by 
the Office of the Secretary (OSD). The endgame of the POM process occurs when, at 
the last moment, the military departments and services have the opportunity to appeal 
and adjust decisions suggested by the OSD. The endgame is notorious for its high-level 
stakes because often decisions on “big ticket” and expensive items are not decided until 
the endgame phase. Following this appeal and adjustment process, the PDMs are 
issued by the OSD that approves and adjusts programs in each POM.  The POM 
amended by the PDM provides the approved baseline for military departments to submit 
their budget inputs. Critical to the match and linkage of programming and budgeting, 
while the programming and budgeting phases of the PPBES operated as a separate 
cycles from the 1960s through the early 2000s, in August 2001, Secretary of Defense 
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Donald Rumsfeld merged the POM and budget-review cycles, as we explain more fully 
below. 
In acquisition program and budget review and decision making, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs is supported by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)—a 
committee led by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, composed of the service Vice-
Chiefs who review all joint acquisition programs and programs where joint interest in 
interoperability is evident. The Chairman then makes recommendations about 
acquisition priorities. This input was changed as a result of passage of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act in 1986 and from experience in the Grenada operation (in which Army and 
Marine troops on the ground could not communicate with other units because the radios 
they used were not interoperable). The JROC approves the mission need and conducts 
an analysis to see how well the suggested acquisition program meets these needs. The 
process of staffing a proposal up to the JROC decision level involves assessment and 
analysis by various committees ending at the Flag level. Analytic effort by the JCS staff 
can take up to four or five months. A successful program that is vetted and found to 
meet joint requirements then has a priority attached to it at the JROC level and is 
passed on into the POM and, later, the budget for funding.  
Part of the 2003 reform was intended to accelerate and improve the acquisition 
process. In April 2002, Defense Planning Guidance study #20 (Secretary of Defense, 
2002b) concluded that the resource requirements process frequently produced 
“stovepiped” systems that were not necessarily based on required capabilities and 
incorporated decisions from a single service perspective. The study found that the 
acquisition process did not always develop requirements in the context of how a joint 
force would fight. Rather, requirements tended to be more service-focused. Moreover, 
duplication of effort was apparent in smaller and less visible programs. The study 
observed that the current culture aimed for the 100% (perfect) solution; this aim resulted 
in lengthy times to field weapons. In addition, the process was found to lack 
prioritization for joint warfighting demands. Ongoing reform has resulted in a reshaping 
of the JROC process so that decisions options can be better arrayed for the JROC to 
make its decision. Two oversight committees now report to it, both headed by flag 
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officers and focused on distinct functional areas. This was another part of 2003 
transitional reforms and is indicative of Secretary Rumsfeld’s interest in joint operations, 
joint warfighting, and a quicker acquisitions process. The Future Year Defense Plan 
(FYDP) is the database of record in which POM and budget actions are tracked and 
recorded. The FYDP is updated after every major process action, e.g., submittal of the 
President’s budget, passage of appropriations by Congress, conclusion of program 
change proposals and budget change proposals.  
Some participants in the PPBES process see the Planning and Programming 
phases as planning and more planning—but they are intended to function very 
differently to produce different outputs. The Planning phase involves ascertaining the 
threat and deciding how it may be diminished or avoided. For example, a national 
strategy that said the US would only intervene in conflict situations where there was an 
over-riding national interest would have substantially decreased operating tempo (the 
analog of workload) for the DoD in the 1990s. Agreements between nations in treaties 
and compacts may either increase or decrease workload for defense. In the 
Programming phase, the major options have been determined, and the Secretary of 
Defense introduces fiscal constraints so that choices are subsequently made about the 
shape of force structure given the decisions made in the Planning process. Thus, the 
Planning and Programming processes are planning processes, but they are very 
different in intended outputs, scale and timeframe. The Planning phase involves 
numerous departments and agencies (some outside of the DoD, including the 
President’s National Security Council, the State Department, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the FBI, etc.) to assess the threat on a global basis, and plots US response 
options to threat without fiscal constraint. The Programming process is internal to the 
DoD and focuses on providing the force structure (aircraft carriers, tanks, personnel) to 
meet the threat within a constrained fiscal target. The Budgeting phase then acquires 




The budgeting phase of the PPBES begins with the approved programs from 
each military department and service POM.  Each military department and service 
costs-out the programs that support the POM for the next fiscal year, conducts its own 
bottom-up budget submission and review cycle (receiving budgets from its own Budget 
Submitting Office (BSO)), and submits its budget to OSD in the Budget Estimate 
Submission (BES).  The BES prepared in even-numbered “POM years” is a two-year 
submission based on the first two years of the POM as adjusted by the PDM.  The 
BESs are amended by the military department and services during the POM update that 
occurs in odd-numbered years and covers only one year. Every BES is reviewed by 
military secretariats under the authority of the military department secretaries because 
budgeting is a civilian function in the DoD, as mandated by Congress in the 1970s. The 
budgets of the military department secretaries are then reviewed by the DoD 
Comptroller, other OSD officials, the JCS and, ultimately, by the Deputy and Secretary 
of Defense.  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense cooperates in this review with the 
President's Office of Management and Budget. Budget review attempts to ensure 
compliance with the SPG, the POMs, the PDM and the President’s National Security 
Strategy. The Secretary of Defense and staff mark changes to the military department 
budgets and provide rationale for these changes in the form of Program Budget 
Decisions (PBD). Before becoming part of the President’s Budget, required for 
submission to Congress no later than the first Monday in February, PBDs are issued to 
allow the military department secretaries and budget staff to respond with appeals of 
cuts (reclamas) to the OSD Comptroller staff and, ultimately if issues are of high enough 
profile, to the Secretary.  Once major budget issues have been resolved, the DoD 
budget for the upcoming fiscal year is sent to OMB to become part of the President’s 
Budget. This step constitutes the end of the budget proposal and review phase of the 
PPBES. However, as noted subsequently, budget execution is a critical part of the 
PPBES and typically is ignored in analysis of this system. 
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Execution 
Budget execution consists of first gaining authority to spend appropriations 
approved by Congress through a separate budget submission process to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Treasury—the apportionment process. In 
apportionment review, the DoD must detail how it intends to spend what has been 
appropriated, by quarter, month, or fiscal year for multiple-year appropriations in strict 
conformance with congressional line-item appropriation instructions. The apportionment 
request is inevitably somewhat changed from what was proposed in the President’s 
budget since Congress appropriates what it wants, not necessarily constrained by what 
the DoD requests. Further, appropriations are tied to specific programs and account 
categories. After allotment approval is received from the OMB and the Treasury, the 
DoD begins the process of allotting shares of the DoD budget to the three military 
departments and services and other DoD commands and defense agencies. After 
receiving their spending allotment authority, these commands begin to incur obligations 
(in contracts and commitments to acquire labor, assets, etc.), and then to liquidate their 
obligations through outlays (actual expense of funds). During this process, comptrollers 
and budget officials at all levels of the DoD monitor and control execution of programs 
and funding. At the mid point of the spending year, the military departments and 
services (and now since 2003, the OSD) conduct mid-year reviews to find and shift 
money to areas of highest priority. At the end of the fiscal year or multi-year 
appropriation period each September, all DoD accounts must be reconciled with 
appropriations and spending must be accounted for prior to closing accounts for further 
obligation. Financial and management audits by military department audit agencies, the 
DoD Inspectors General, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and other entities follow 
the conclusion of execution and reporting. 
In 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and staff transformed the PPBES  
decision cycle and also added an “E” to PPB to emphasize the importance of budget 
execution. The new PPBE system is part of the transformation of business affairs 
initiative led by the Secretary of Defense in the DoD, and it constitutes a significant 
initiative to improve and correct many of the evident problems that have weighed-down 
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the functioning of the PPBS for decades. First, the change to the PPBES merged 
separate program and budget review processes into a single review cycle performed 
concurrently rather than sequentially. Second, it incorporated a budget process 
matched to the presidential electoral cycle, with major strategic changes slated for the 
second and fourth years of a Presidential term and minimal updating of plans and 
programs in the first and third years, given no major change in the threat. Third, it fixed 
timing of the process so that planning and budgeting were clearly derivative processes 
driven by the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Military Strategy. Fourth, it 
changed the cycle for Office of the Secretary of Defense provision of top-level planning 
information to the military departments and services from an annual to a multi-year 
schedule with the combined program and budget review. The essence of the PPBES 
transformation is establishment of a four-year resource planning and decision cycle. 
What transformation of the PPBES allows is that in a four-year Presidential 
administration, fundamental change is targeted for the second year of the cycle with the 
first and third years changed only as threat environment demands increased 
modification.  Given a stable environment, year two would result in the most 
fundamental analysis and change in plans, programs and budgets. Whether the 
defense environment is stable enough to support a four-year decision system remains 
to be seen. We now move to address this and other questions with respect to the 
consequences of recent PPBES transformation.  
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PPBES TRANSFORMATION: CHANGES AND 
CONSEQUENCES  
As noted, PPBES changes have created a combined two-year program and 
budget-review decision cycle (but not a biennial budget), with a complete review in year 
one, followed by limited incremental review in year two. This change in cycle from a full-
program review and a full-budget review to a combined review is meant to reduce the 
inefficiencies of unnecessary re-making of program decisions; the program should drive 
the budget rather than the opposite. With the programming and budgeting cycles 
operating contemporaneously, decisions are intended to be arrived at more effectively, 
whether they are made in the off- or on-year. Changes made in each off-year cycle are 
intended to have quicker effect by compressing the programming and budgeting cycles 
while still preserving the decisions made in the on-year cycle through the off-year by 
limiting reconsideration of decisions to only the most necessary updates. In essence, 
decisions flow from the Quadrennial Defense Review and other studies; then, a 
structure is erected in the Strategic and Joint Planning Guidances that provides 
direction for the remaining years of a Presidential term. This structure remains in place 
unless dramatic changes in worldwide threat occur. Year-to-year changes in the 
program structure and budget then are made only to adjust to incremental fact-of-life 
changes. The inefficiencies of conducting comprehensive reviews every year (as 
intended in the previous PPBS process) are avoided, and the decision process itself 
supposedly moves more responsively to warfighting and preparation demands.  
In this new PPBES cycle, the first and third years are off-years. During these off-
years, military departments and the military commanders of major commands may 
create Program Change Proposals (PCPs) to affect the POM, and Budget Change 
Proposals (BCPs) to justify new budget requirements. The PCPs allow for fact-of-life 
changes to the previous year’s POM; they are meant to be few and of relatively large 
size, and they must be balanced so they pay for themselves. Guidance for 2003 
indicated the PCPs had to exceed a set-dollar threshold or had to be driven by serious 
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policy and programmatic implications. For example, in 2003 the Navy submitted only 
three PCPs, one worth $100 million that involved 450 line items.  
The PCP process provided the combatant commanders (those with direct 
warfighting responsibilities) with a new tool in the PPBES process, but like the military 
departments, they have to suggest offsets. For example, if a warfighter wants to 
increase force protection in one area at a certain cost, he/she has to suggest weakening 
force protection in another area as an offset or tradeoff for the increase. This is meant to 
be a zero-sum game. Changes have to be accompanied by offsets. As is usual with any 
offset procedure, budget claimants who submit either PCPs or BCPs take the risk that 
the offsets they suggest will be accepted, but the accompanying change proposals the 
offsets were intended to fund might not be funded. In such cases, the offset reveals a 
cache of money for a lower-priority item that might be directed to a higher-priority area. 
The budget change proposals (BCPs) were expected to be more numerous than PCPs, 
but smaller. They too would be largely fact-of-life changes (e.g., cost increases, 
schedule delays, new congressional directives) and would have to be paid for by 
offsets. Although the individual BCP need not be offset, the package of offsets proposed 
by a military department has to be offset and provide a zero-balance change. Whether 
in an off-year or an on-year, the results from the above decisions are consolidated into 
one database. This is an important change to the PPB system which had multiple 
databases for different purposes.  
One significant result of the 2003 budget process reform is that unless a budget 
change proposal is explicitly approved, then unit budgets are the same as they were in 
the previous year. This might be termed “re-appropriating the base.” Even if an inflation 
adjustment is given, no new program changes are created. Thus, if a unit does well in 
the on-year cycle (second year and fourth year), then it may carry some “fat” through 
the off-years. Since the stakes are now higher, it would seem that one long-run 
consequence would be an increase in the intensity of the struggle during the on-year 
process, both within the Pentagon and Congress. Success is rewarded for at least two 
years, and failure is doubly penalized. In other words, to change in the off-year, offsets 
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have to be offered up; so, the only way to get better in the off-year is by giving up 
something else.  
Also, this new process puts the Secretary of Defense into the decision 
environment at an earlier stage than in the old PPB process; it puts him “in the driver’s 
seat,” in the words of one budgeteer. Decisions in the new PPBES are intended to 
reach the Secretary while options are still open, and while important and large-scale 
changes still can be proposed—before the final decision has become a foregone 
conclusion at the military department level. When the Defense Secretary’s input came 
at the end of the stream of decisions, some changes that could have been made were 
pre-empted because they would have caused too much “breakage” in other programs. 
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DECISION SYSTEMS FOR ACQUISITION 
As it is now structured, the architecture of the PPBES interacts with two other 
major systems for acquisition planning, decision making and execution. These two 
systems are: 
1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is 
employed for determining warfighting requirements; 
2. The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is a system used for planning, 
decision and execution for research and development, test and evaluation 
and then procurement of capital assets. 
These three systems—the PPBES, the JCIDS and the DAS—comprise the core 
of the DoD financial resource and acquisition decision making, allocation and execution 
process. Let us examine the JCIDS and the DAS more closely. 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
The Joint Capabilities System (JCIDS) has replaced what used to be known as 
the Requirements Generation System (RGS). Through the JCIDS, defense decision 
makers apply the prevailing precepts of national and defense strategy to create joint 
fighting forces capable of performing the military operations required by the nature of 
the threat faced by US armed forces—something that is constantly changing. The 
JCIDS process is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The JCIDS Process  (From Bowman, 2003) 
The JCIDS was developed to identify joint warfighting requirements and to 
emphasize a top-down orientation to decision making.  Instead of the former process—
in which military departments and services determined mission requirements and 
identified joint needs to increase program funding attractiveness as they prepared and 
routed their acquisition program proposals up the chain of command—in JCIDS, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman first determines if the required capability exists, 
then pushes it down to the resource sponsor in the military departments and services 
for acquisition.  If jointness in acquisition and procurement is required, then the program 
is essentially “born joint." In addition, the term “capabilities-based” is a recent refinement 
of guidance for the entire purpose of the acquisition decision system.  In the JCIDS, 
gaps in warfighting capability, either current or those programmed in the Future Years 
Defense Plan (FYDP), are identified—and any risks associated with gaps are quantified.  
JCIDS decision makers then determine future capabilities to address existing gaps.  In 
doing so, it is important the decision makers be specific enough about a new capability 
to include key attributes with appropriate measures of effectiveness, supportability, time, 
distance, effect (including scale) and obstacles to be overcome. Additionally, the 
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capability needs be general enough not to prejudice decisions in favor of a particular 
means of implementation.   
The Defense Acquisition System  
Whereas top level DoD decision makers use the JCIDS to identify capability 
requirements as current and future threat scenarios emerge, the Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS) evaluates JCIDS-defined capability gaps, and initiates and executes 
acquisition and procurement programs to field systems to bridge these gaps.  In 
situations where the technology exists to fill a requirement, the DAS exists to acquire a 
tailored and capable product quickly and in a cost-efficient manner.  When new 
technology is required to fill a capability gap, it is through the DAS that the DoD 
develops, tests, demonstrates and deploys the new technology in a timely manner and 
at a fair and reasonable price.  In either case, the DAS is forward-looking and tries to 
ensure that systems fielded support not only today’s fighting forces, but also those of 
the future. 
The DAS exists in a highly dynamic and political environment.  Since defense 
acquisition in aggregate involves billions of dollars each year, the process, participants 
and individual programs are linked to powerful stakeholders. These include the 
executive branch of the federal government with the DoD acting as its agent, the 
legislative branch where the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations 
committees decide what assets will be acquired and funded, private industry where 
large defense contractors compete for business, market share, and product continuity, 
in which the subcontractors and small businesses seek a piece of the business, and 
state and local governments where the defense industrial base is located, where the 
workforce lives, where dollars are spent and taxes are collected. These stakeholders 
are both supportive in seeking dollars for defense acquisition and rivals for business. 
This is true not only in the private sector, but between the military departments and the 
DoD, the military departments and each other, and within the military departments as 
potential programs compete for approval and budget.  
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Since the DoD determines DAS policies and procedures, negotiates each annual 
budget, makes decisions regarding acquisition programs and the awarding of lucrative 
contracts to private industry, each major player in the process with authority may 
attempt to exert influence in the DAS, be it for efficiency reasons, career or 
organizational ambition or relative to other sources of motivation.  Ultimately, Congress 
holds the power of the purse and must balance defense and non-defense spending.  
Nonetheless, all these stakeholders compete for some sort of corporate, organizational 
and professional gain. DoD acquisition is performed in the highly competitive, but only 
partially transparent, environment of the nation’s capitol. 
To do their jobs well, those who manage projects within the DoD must 
understand the political, social and economic aspects and consequences of the defense 
acquisition process.  From the lowest echelons of program management to the top, the 
Under-secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD, AT&L)), all 
DoD participants must be both knowledgeable and sensitive to the competing forces 
and attempt to craft each program and project so that, ultimately, warfighters are 
provided the best assets to support national security policy. The key stages or milestone 
points of the DAS process move from requirements setting and concept design to 
determine weapon system needs by the end users—the fighting forces—through 
technology and systems development to production (procurement) and deployment to 










Figure 4. The Defense Acquisition System: Major Phases/Milestones 
 (From DoD, 2003, DoDD 5000.1, p. 2) 
According to the DoD Directive 5000.1 (12 May 2003), Defense Acquisition is, 
“the management process by which the Department of Defense provides effective, 
affordable and timely systems to users” (DoDD 5000.1, 2003. p. 2).  Whereas decision 
makers use JCIDS to identify capability requirements as the current and future threat 
dictates, the DAS takes JCIDS-discovered capability gaps, and initiates and executes 
procurement programs to field systems to bridge these gaps. In situations where the 
technology exists to fill a requirement, the DAS exists to acquire a capable product 
quickly and in a cost-efficient manner. When new technology is required to fill a 
capability gap, it is through the DAS that DoD develops, tests, demonstrates and 
deploys the new technology, “in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable price” 
(DoDD 5000.1, 2003, p. 2). 
In late 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz canceled the 
existing set of DoD 5000 series acquisition regulations. In his memorandum, he 
explained that the acquisition system as defined by these regulations was not flexible, 
creative or efficient enough to meet the needs of the DoD. Therefore, he ordered a 
revision of the acquisition process and a reissue of the directives to, “rapidly deliver 
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affordable, sustainable capability to the warfighter that meets the warfighter’s needs.” 
(Wolfowitz, 2003, p. 1). 
The DAS process breaks the project lifecycle into three general stages: 
presystems acquisition, systems acquisition, and sustainment. These three stages are 
further divided into five distinct sub-phases: Concept Refinement (CR), Technology 
Development (TD), System Development and Demonstration (SDD), Production and 
Deployment (P&D), and Operations and Support (O&S), as shown in Figure 4. These 
processes guide a program from initial exploration of required capability (as detailed in 
an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)), to the production and deployment of a 
technologically mature weapons system, including required operational support.  
Additionally, each program has a distinct chain of command through which 
decisions are made. Depending on the size and visibility of a particular program, there 
may be up to four levels in the chain of command before the ultimate decision is made 
by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). Complex programs are sometimes divided 
into smaller elements and assigned groups of acquisition professionals across a range 
of functional disciplines. These groups are called Integrated Process Teams (IPTs). 
Some serve as executors of their respective functional program area. Others serve as 
advisory bodies. 
The Program Manager is at the bottom of the chain of command. According to 
the new DoDD 5000.1, the PM, a middle-range military or defense civilian (O-5/O-6) is 
the individual with responsibility for and authority to accomplish program objectives for 
development, production, and sustainment to include “credible cost, schedule, and 
performance reporting to the MDA” (DAU 2003, p. 2). The PM reports to a Program 
Executive Officer (PEO). The PEO, a one- or two-star flag officer or senior executive 
service (SES) equivalent, is responsible for a group of like programs within each military 
department and service. PEOs report to Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs). 
Each service has one CAE responsible for the management direction of their respective 
procurement system. The Secretary of the Navy has delegated this position to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition 
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(ASN(RDA)). Finally, the CAE reports to the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). The 
DoD has only one DAE, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics (USD (AT&L)). The USD (AT&L) is authorized under title 10, US Code to 
be, “the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of 
Defense for all matters relating to the DoD acquisition system; research and 
development; advanced technology; developmental test and evaluation; production; 
logistics; etc.”  Also, as the DAE, he presides over the military department and service 
secretaries and, “is responsible for establishing acquisition policies and procedures for 
the Department. He also chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), and makes 
milestone decisions on Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID programs” (DAU 2003, p. 31). 
Programs are categorized by whether they are a DoD-wide asset or an asset for one 
service and by estimated dollars to be expended, with different rules applying to 
different-sized programs. 
The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), i.e., overall responsibility for all 
programs, may be delegated to anyone in this chain of command. The MDA for many 
small programs is the PM, whereas MDA for the large procurement programs and the 
most politically sensitive programs is usually held at the top by the USD (AT&L). 
The DAS Process 
Program movement through the three DAS stages is strictly controlled through a 
series of six decision points and program reviews. The first stage of the DAS is pre-
systems acquisition. Pre-systems acquisition activities are focused on refining material 
solutions to needs as defined in a published Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). This 
stage is split into two phases: Concept Resolution and Technological Development. 
Before entering the CR phase, the first decision, the Concept Decision (CD), must be 
made. Using information provided by the ICD, as well as the “plan” to conduct an 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) documented in the ICD, the MDA uses the CD to initiate 
the acquisition process. The CD is used to approve the AoA plan, to set a date for 
Milestone A review and to designate a lead Service for the program. All of these MDA 
decisions are formally documented in the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM). 
Under the directional guidance from the ADM and the ICD, the CR phase is used to 
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conduct the AoA that will refine the concept presented in the ICD and develop the 
associated Technology Development Strategy (TDS) to be used to guide the follow-on 
phase. The AoA hones the concept by assessing a variety of current (to include 
commercial-off-the-shelf or COTS) and future technologies, the maturity of these 
technologies and the risk associated with each. Competition and innovation are deemed 
critical early in the process so that concept solutions from a variety of large and small 
suppliers are considered to achieve the highest probability of program efficiency, 
effectiveness, stakeholder buy-in and ultimately, success. The TDS establishes the 
justification for either an evolutionary (spiral) or single-step-to-full-capability acquisition 
strategy. It describes, “how the program will be divided into technology spirals and 
development increments, an appropriate limitation on the number of prototype units that 
may be produced and deployed during (TD), how these units will be supported, and 
specific performance goals and exit criteria that must be met before exceeding the 
number of prototypes that may be produced under the (R&D) program” (DAU 2003, p. 
5).  Because an official acquisition program has not yet been initiated, funding for pre-
Milestone A efforts is normally restricted to only work that is done in the CR phase. The 
first phase concludes, and the second major decision point (Milestone A) is reached 
when the MDA approves both the preferred solution supported by the AoA and the TDS. 
Once Milestone A is achieved, the Technology Development stage begins. With 
the exception of some high-dollar shipbuilding programs, an official acquisition program 
has still not considered to have been initiated at this point. Therefore, funding is 
restricted to work that is done in this phase, the intent of which is to, “reduce technology 
risk and to determine the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full 
system” (DAU 2003, p. 6). This stage is iterative in that the technologies to be refined 
are continuously developed and processed through close interaction between the S&T 
community, the users and the developers. As such, the TDS is constantly reviewed and 
updated with each incremental effort as the technology demonstrations gradually show 
the proposed solution to be, “affordable, militarily useful, and based on mature 
technology” (DAU 2003, p. 6).  
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The TD phase ends when either the MDA decides to terminate the effort, or the 
third major decision point (Milestone B) is achieved. To be granted Milestone B 
approval, the second major JCIDS analysis (the Capability Development Document 
(CDD)) must be approved through the JCIDS process, and the MDA must approve both 
the acquisition strategy and the acquisition program baseline. The MDA must be 
satisfied that an affordable increment of militarily useful capability has been identified, 
the technology for that increment has been demonstrated in a relevant environment, 
and development and production of a system can be achieved within a relatively 
acceptable timeframe (normally less than five years).  With an ICD providing the 
context, and an approved CDD describing specific program requirements, Milestone B 
approval is achieved, signaling the availability of sufficient technology maturity. When 
funding is approved by Congress and apportioned from the DoD—critical steps—then a 
formal acquisition program is born and moves forward in the DAS process. 
If a program is to be executed in increments or spirals through an evolutionary 
acquisition process, each increment will be its own program from the Development and 
Demonstration phase forward. Each increment or spiral must have its own Milestone B 
and C approval. Additionally, increment-specific KPPs must be delineated in the CDD 
for each increment or spiral. Finally, before beginning this phase, and with the current 
increment TDS as a basis, the program manager must build and the MDA must approve 
an acquisition strategy for follow-on increments. Solutions to capability needs can come 
from a variety of sources, including COTS as well as previously discovered mature 
technologies that heretofore had no obvious DoD application. As such, not all 
acquisition efforts need start in CR. Some programs can enter the DAS at later stages; 
the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) stage marks the first point at which 
a more mature technology with an approved ICD and CDD may enter the DAS for 
further refinement without undergoing the scrutiny of CR or TD. 
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) has two main purposes: system 
integration and system demonstration. Systems integration involves integration of both 
mature technologies and component subsystems into one complete design that meets 
the stated requirement. Additionally, at this point, design detail should be achieved as 
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well as tradeoffs considered between risk and technology maturity. Risk is defined as 
how much less capability is allowable while still providing the warfighter with a system 
that meets the intent of the ICD. Thus, decisions must be made to ascertain what is 
necessary and what is achievable based on the maturity of the technologies involved. 
During this stage, such risk decisions must be objectively determined by the program 
decision makers to limit program costs and the overall time required for systems 
development. 
CDDs are promulgated in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) and include lifecycle or total ownership cost estimations that are then 
used to fulfill the requirement to fully fund the program throughout the FYDP. Even 
though these estimates are based on technologies deemed mature enough to move on 
to SDD, technologies in many cases are still very new. Still, it is the maturity of the 
elements of a procurement program that ultimately determines the course of the 
acquisition process, the cost, and the time required to field the system. Coupled with the 
fact that the entire acquisition process evidences considerable spontaneous discovery, 
the probability that an entire program with many subparts will come together through the 
systems integration phase and beyond as initially predicted in the CDD is close to nil. 
Therefore, a continuous stream of tradeoffs between system-combined technologies 
(that have yet to be fully demonstrated as a whole system) and the time required to 
develop the technologies make the forecasting of program cost difficult. It is the job of 
the PM to manage the three variables (cost, schedule and performance) and to make 
hard choices to field a system in a timely manner to meet program prerequisites while 
attempting to control costs. 
Systems integration is considered complete when a working prototype has been 
designed, tested, and documented as functional in an environment appropriate to that in 
which the user will employ it. Another decision, the design readiness review (DRR), 
must be successfully negotiated to move to the next part of SDD: systems development. 
The DRR is a mid-phase assessment of the design to document the complete system in 
terms of:  
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the percentage of drawings completed; planned corrective actions to 
hardware/software deficiencies; adequate development testing; an assessment 
of environment, safety and occupational health risks; a completed failure modes 
and effects analysis; the identification of key system characteristics and critical 
manufacturing processes; an estimate of system reliability based on 
demonstrated reliability rates; etc. (DAU 2003, p. 8) 
The DRR is somewhat flexible in that the MDA may format it as applicable to the nature 
of the specific program. Systems demonstration is the process of taking the whole 
system as designed and proven “functional” in systems integration, and applying it to 
the appropriate environment such that the stated KPPs may be effectively 
demonstrated. This phase is complete when both the whole system is verified as useful 
and capable, and the appropriate industrial capability exists to allow the program to 
move on to the next phase, production and deployment (P&D). Additionally, to gain 
Milestone C approval, the MDA needs to be satisfied that the program is ready to be 
committed to production. Otherwise, the MDA must terminate the program. Finally, the 
CPD must be obtained through the JCIDS process. This step declares that the 
performance required to exit the SDD phase and the forecasted production capability 
required to successfully accomplish the P&D phase are in place. 
The objective of the fourth phase of acquisition, P&D, is to establish the full 
operational capability of the program, the ability to produce it in an optimal manner, and 
to ensure that the final system meets original JCIDS intent as stated in the ICD. P&D 
begins with Milestone C approval that commits the DoD to production of the program. 
As such, it authorizes the program to enter either low-rate initial production (LRIP) for 
large programs that require this approach, full production for smaller programs that do 
not, or limited deployment and test for information systems that are software intensive.  
There are two aspects to P&D. The first is operational test and evaluation 
(OT&E), including both initial (IOT&E) and follow-on (FOT&E). The test products used 
come from the production line (either LRIP or otherwise as applicable) and the Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—for those products requiring DOT&E 
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oversight—or the appropriate Operational Test Agency (OTA) determines the number of 
production-line units required for the testing regimen. The other aspect to the P&D 
phase is the ability of the established production line to handle the job of producing the 
required units at the rate required by contract. For large-scale production efforts, LRIP is 
required to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability, to produce the 
minimum quantity necessary to provide units for IOT&E, to establish an initial production 
base for the system, and to permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the 
system (sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon successful testing) (DAU 2003, p. 
9). 
For programs requiring Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), the final decision 
analysis, provided in the Full Rate Production (FRP) Decision Review, is required 
before moving into full-speed production. This decision is made by the MDA after 
consideration of, “initial operational test and evaluation and live fire test and evaluation 
results (if applicable); demonstrated interoperability; supportability; cost and manpower 
estimates; and command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence 
supportability and certification (if applicable)” (DAU 2003, p. 56). During FRP, the fully 
funded program is produced and delivered to the user. The PM is busy ensuring that 
systems are produced efficiently and arrive in the field in the manner established in the 
CPD. Also, as program changes are required, DOT&E may direct FOT&E to verify that 
the corrections are sufficient and that the system still meets operational requirements.  
Finally, as the first production units are delivered to the user, the O&S phase 
begins. There is an overlap in the last two phases, and the PM must maintain oversight 
of both. O&S has two distinct parts: sustainment and disposal. Logistics and readiness 
matters at this point include maintenance, transportation, manpower, personnel, 
training, safety, survivability, etc.; these matters are a primary focus of the PM during 
sustainment. There are a number of post-design and production factors, such as the 
fleet logistics capability for the Navy, for example, that must be addressed and tested 
during this phase before ascertaining the supportability of the program through 
established channels, be they military or commercial. Assets also are tested for 
efficiency to determine system ability to effectively provide support to the user in the 
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most cost-efficient manner to achieve the lowest possible lifecycle and, to the extent 
possible, total ownership cost. Since many programs stay in the field for years, even 
decades, the PM must work with the user to document the O&S requirements to 
continuously evaluate the lifecycle costs, making improvements or service life 
extensions as necessary in an attempt to control and contain total ownership costs. 
The last phase of the DAS, disposal, is focused on meeting the costs associated 
with the end of the useful life of an asset. Throughout the design process, the PM must 
detail hazards that will affect end-of-life costs and must estimate and plan for eventual 
disposal costs. When the system finally reaches the end of its useful life, the PM is 
responsible for ushering it through the process of demilitarization and disposal, “in 
accordance with all legal and regulatory requirements and policy relating to safety 
(including explosives safety), security, and the environment” (DAU 2003, p. 11). In 
summary, from the description above it is clear that the DAS is a highly complex,  
protracted decision process and management control system, which explains in part 
why it takes so long to acquire new defense assets. Could this process be reduced in 
terms of complexity, number of decision steps, players, and decision cycle-time through 
process reengineering? This is a question tangential to the thrust of this article, but one 
that deserves further attention. 
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LINKAGES BETWEEN DECISION SYSTEMS 
The JCIDS and the DAS systems are tied to each other a number of different 
ways.  The primary goal of the DAS is to acquire capabilities for the DoD as directed 
through the Joint Chiefs. This relationship is carried out formally through the four formal 
JCIDS documents as well as through the many required DAS program reviews. They 
are also informally linked through the leaders of each process, some of whom have 
multiple roles to play in both. 
As noted in part, the JCIDS documents include the Initial Capabilities Documents 
(ICDs), Capability Development Documents (CDDs), Capability Production Documents 
(CPDs) and the Capstone Requirements Documents (CRDs). These are directly and 
formally linked to DAS events. They are governed by policy and regulation and provide 
critical information to DAS leaders with respect to critical program elements like 
performance criteria, program size, impacts and constraints. They also help specify the 
level of administrative oversight required. 
Generally, different JCIDS documents are required before each DAS milestone 
review; also, DAS players have to submit documents to JCIDS players for approval 
before a program can proceed past a milestone; for example, before milestone B 
approval, “the CDD must be received from the JCIDS leadership. For the JCIDS 
decision-makers to approve the CDD, they must receive data from the DAS 
representatives and review the progress of the program” (Fierstine, 2004, p. 55). This 
represents a formal relationship where documents are passed back and forth between 
players in these two systems, with one set providing data and the other approving it 
before the first may give milestone approval. Notice in the schematic how each of the 
milestone decision points (MS A, MS B, MS C) is accompanied by input from the JCIDS 






Figure 5. Formal Pathways from the JCIDS to the DAS 
Source: (DoDI 5000.2, 2003, p. 3). Note: Circles indicate linkage zones between the JCIDS and the DAS.  
Also, critical formal links are created between the two systems when the same 
players hold important positions in both systems. First among these is the Secretary of 
Defense and his staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretary for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and Assistant Secretaries including the DoD 
Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer, and the Secretary for Planning, Analysis and 
Evaluation. The USD (AT&L) is central to this process as he chairs the DAB and is the 
Milestone Decision Authority for all the large procurement programs. He also has the 
authority to ask the JROC to review a program at any time. This gives him a powerful 
hand in both the JCIDS and DAS processes. The Deputy Secretary of Defense chairs 
the Senior Leaders Review Group (SLRG), in which all the important decisions are 
made which involve both JCIDS and DAS items. Various Under and Assistant 
Secretaries of Defense serve on the SLRG, the DAB, and Functional Capabilities 
Boards (FCB). Probably the most important of these is the Assistant Secretary of 
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Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) who serves on both the 
DAB, the SLRG and the FCBs.  
On the military side of the house, the most important link is probably the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (VCJCS) who functions as chairman of the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and is Vice Chair of both the Senior Leader 
Review Group (SLRG) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). Staff organizations 
within the Joint Staff apparatus also are important. These include the offices of J-8 (the 
Joint Potential Designator (JPD) Gatekeeper), J-7, ( the executive agent for 
transformation), and J-6 (the agent who ensures IT/NSS interoperability and provides 
review, coordination and certification functions in support of the JCIDS and DAS) 
(CJCS, 2004, 3170.01D, p. B-4).  
Within the military departments, the vice chiefs of each service sit on the JROC, 
and the service secretaries sit on both the DAB and the SLRG. It should be 
remembered that individual military personnel form the lion’s share of representation on 
oversight and analysis bodies related to both processes.  Also, the Services are the 
sponsors for every program and research effort, and they staff the program offices.  
Furthermore, the Services run the JCIDS analysis processes. 
Since the JCIDS and the DAS are event-driven systems, they follow similar 
patterns and are linked through their programs and documentation. In contrast, the 
PPBES is a calendar-driven sequence of events. JCIDS or DAS events may or may not 
fit neatly in the POM/budget cycle. DAS events may or may not fit neatly into the off-
year or on-year cycle. For example, when a major program gets a “go” signal in an off-
year, what this does to the basic concept of off-year is yet to be determined. It hardly 
seems like the program will be told to wait until next year, but if resources then are 
committed, does this mean that decision space is pre-empted from the following on- 
year? Does this mean the on-year becomes an off-year? What if the “go” signal occurs 
in the first year of a Presidential regime? Will this mean a wait? If it is a major capacity-
enhancing acquisition, what will this mean for the QDR scheduled to arrive some 12 
months later? Will strategy and doctrinal changes be pre-empted? What if a large 
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program appears about to fail a major milestone, but it has been counted on as a part of 
a Presidential legacy in the fourth year of a Presidency: will the program be ”forced” and 
the assumption made that it will get well (that its difficulty will be corrected) in the off-
years (e.g., the USMC V-22 Osprey aircraft)? These decisions have consequences for 
each other, just as the battlefield concept in the late 1990s when the decision about 
armoring Humvees was made; doctrine appears to have envisioned a front-line/rear-
area split with little need to armor Humvees because only a few would be used in or 
near the front line. Iraq did not turn out that way, hence the scramble to uparmor 
Humvees.  
The point is that any procurement effort can span multiple annual PPBES cycles, 
be under the influence of a series of layered PPBES decisions and feed data back into 
any number of current and future PPBES phases. The link to the PPBES formally 
comes from the Strategic Planning Council (SPC) which develops the Strategic 
Planning Guidance (SPG).  The SPC is led by SECDEF and made up of the Senior 
Leaders Review Group (SLRG) and the Combatant Commanders; it includes virtually all 
of the senior leadership in the DoD, civilian and military, including 19 four-star billets, 
the service secretaries and various OSD-level representatives. This group produces the 
Strategic Planning Guidance, although it probably would be most correct to say that it is 
produced for SECDEF, belongs to him, and that his views are predominant in the end 
product. The SPG sets the scene for the POM-budget process, feeding directly into the 
POM. It identifies and sets up DoD-wide trade-offs and identifies joint needs, excesses 
and gaps; it focuses on such things as threat changes, war-plans analysis, new 
concepts, and lessons learned.  
For example, one lesson learned might be that US forces may have to be 
prepared to fight in both traditional and non-traditional battlefields (e.g., Iraq); this lesson 
has significant consequences for both doctrine and attributes of warfighting platforms. If 
Humvees are going to be at risk of taking direct and high-powered fire wherever they go 
(in a front-line is everywhere GWOT scenario), then their armor needs change. The 
POM process is also informed by issues surfaced by the Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMS) routed through an extended planning process to the joint staff. The result of 
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this input of information is the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) and the 
Joint Planning Guidance (JPG), which help integrate joint capabilities into the POM 
process. The link between the DAS and the PPBES is that the JCIDS’s capabilities 
analysis model is used to examine current and forecasted capability needs.   
At the service level, a number of other interactions exist. In the Department of the 
Navy, for example, during the POM and budget build/review processes, the Navy 
requirements officers and analysts under N7 and the Financial Managers and analysts 
under N8 independently conduct their own campaigns, scenario and program analyses.  
In doing so, they use the same scenarios, simulations and models as are used in the 
JCIDS by OSD, the joint staff and the rest of the MILDEPS.  Additionally, all the data 
regarding past, current and future program cost comes from the program offices who 
manage the Services’ acquisition programs.   
At the most basic level, the PPBE system and the Defense Acquisition system 
are linked through program cost data.  Program offices build OSIPs (Operational Safety 
Improvement Programs); these are used to create the budget line items that detail 
program cost data and to feed that data through their budget offices for their programs 
(BFMs) to the Navy Budget office (FMB); here, it is used during program-cost analysis 
throughout the year.  When the Navy Budget Office asks questions about a program or 
recommends changes, those are answered or completed based on the data provided in 
these OSIPs.  These requests may happen during the budgeting phase, when marks 
and reclamas (appeals of budget cuts) are made, or during budget execution.  The 
analysts in N7, who represent the warfare requirements community, and the analysts in 
N8, who are the budgeters and linked to the PPBE, closely monitor the acquisition 
programs. In the current year, if a program is under-executing, then the program and 
budget analysts will make adjustments as necessary to ensure that money is diverted to 
those programs that will spend it by the end of the appropriation period. 
The result is that the warfighting-needs system, the acquisition system (DAS), 
and the PPBE system focus around various points of integration and articulation—from 
an assessment of the threat in the SPG to a design for joint capabilities in the JPG 
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through the POM building process and into the annual budget preparation and review 
processes. Most, if not all, of the top leaders hold multiple responsibilities in these 
systems. While formal documents provide for co-ordination, some co-ordination 
happens by forcing decisions on different aspects of defense needs through the same 
sets of players. Formal documents are required and reviewed by these players before 
decisions are made initially and at subsequent important check points, be they 
milestones, POM, or budget decisions. Additionally, staffs of analysts in different 
organizational locales have responsibilities for data production and review in program 
creation, implementation, and execution. They tend to be focused on a single-issue—
on, for example, the best weapon system, or the most weapon systems for the money 
available this year. These players assume coordination and integration is done at levels 
above them or prior to program starts, or whenever the POM is built and reviewed, or 
whenever the threat changes or when new capabilities are needed or old capabilities 
may be foregone, or even when a strike in a tin mine in South America may imperil the 
pace of a program.  
There is no doubt but that this is a complicated arrangement. Perhaps the single 
most confounding factor in these equations is time. Weapon systems take time to 
develop and build. The V-22 for the Marine Corps has been in development of one sort 
or another since the late 1980s, the Navy LPD-17 since 1998. The engineering and 
deploying of the surveillance drone in Afghanistan in 18 months is the exception to the 
rule. Most weapons acquisition programs take years to develop. The procurement effort 
can span multiple annual PPBES cycles, be under the influence of a series of layered 
PPBES decisions and feed data back into any number of current and future PPBES 
phases. 
What this means is that when complicated programs (all weapons programs are 
complicated) are conceived and developed, they proceed through a series of PPBES 
processes. What this means in practice is that they also are reviewed by different 
individuals. Turnover in personnel in the DoD is high. This happens by law and practice 
for military leaders; the effect is that turnover happens every two to three years. This 
level of turnover is just as true on the civilian side. Thus, the Marine V-22 program has 
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seen six different Secretaries of Defense. It was begun under Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger and continued under Secretaries Dick Cheney, Les Aspin, William 
Perry, William Cohen, and Donald Rumsfeld. In fact, the average tenure of senior 
leadership in the DoD is 1.7 years. Thus, co-ordination by position is riskier than it 
seems. If the distance between milestones A and B or B and C is more than two years, 
it is highly likely that most of the players in the SLRG will have changed. Even when 
they are the same people, they may be sitting in new positions and have changed the 
interests they represent. This is true for both civilian and military leaders. The result is 
that one should not count on the effectiveness of coordination by position. This leaves 
coordination by document as the fall-back position. Fiscal climate is also a complicating 
factor. Weapons systems that take years to develop and field will go thru varying fiscal 
climates: for example, the V-22 started in a rich procurement environment in the mid-
1980s and was kept alive in the procurement holiday in the1990s. Change also comes 
from change in the threat situation or battlefield doctrine: Secretary Rumsfeld’s goal of 
transforming the Army to a lighter, agile, and more lethal organization doomed the 
Crusader artillery system. Another aspect of this happens when a service can not 
decide on the capabilities it wants and, thus, decides to maximize all capabilities; this is 
roughly what happened to Navy air plans in the early 1990s. The result was a years-
long delay for plans for new aircraft. Thus, the passage of time means that people, 
resources, and doctrine change. These are all threats to the orderly integration of the 






ASSESSING PROBLEMS WITH PPBES AND DAS 
ALIGNMENT  
In the research project that produced this article, interviews were conducted in 
the Pentagon environment on the topic of the degree of fit between PPBES and 
Acquisition decision systems. A number of current and past DoD process players in and 
around the Beltway were interviewed, including some now working in the private sector 
doing business with the DoD. Those interviewed in this project included representatives 
of Navy contractors, representatives from Navy air and sea system commands, 
Washington-based Navy resource management officials, OSD acquisition officials and 
active and retired JCS officials. Interviews were supplemented by discussions and 
briefings by high-level military officials in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
(PA&E) and the Joint Chiefs’ staff (J-8).  
We make no claim that our interview findings are definitive, but they provide 
insight into potential (perceived as real) dysfunctions within and between the PPBES 
and DAS analysis and decision processes.  First, interviewees voiced concern with what 
we may term political issues: that all levels of the chain of command produce budget 
estimates that are above guidance, that the political sensitivity of large weapons 
programs affects requirements analysis and resource decisions, and that many decision 
makers use political clout to stave off directives from higher authority. Secondly, they 
criticized process: that a small number of people in the processes have disproportionate 
influence, that decisions are adversely affected by time compression—compounded by 
the lack of sufficient information—and that decisions are adversely impacted by the 
existence of too many approval levels in the acquisition chain of command.  Thirdly, 
they focused on management and cost issues: there is excessive duplication within and 
between the PPBES and DAS processes at all levels; that repetitious calculation of 
program costs in response to program and budget “drills” has an adverse effect on 
motivation, and that absence of clarity and consensus on costs causes significant 
difficulty in execution when budgeted funds are lower than required.  Insofar as 
transformation is concerned, they reported that concurrent program and budget review 
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in the new PPBES process has caused a significant increase in workload without a 
significant increase in benefits; transformation has not resolved the issue of 
communicating appropriate information to decision makers, and transformational 
change actually has slowed down many stages of the review and decision processes.  
They identified barriers to change to include: (a) emergent user needs are not 
addressed adequately; (b) there is an over-reliance on correct verbiage in the OSIPs; 
(c) blanket joint requirements are ill-defined and cumbersome to work through; (d) the 
distribution of common funds is inequitable; (e) innovation is hindered because the type 
of rigid control exercised over multiyear procurements constrains program flexibility; (f) 
with regard to program documentation, required process forms and “semantics” 
sometimes confuses intent; (g) budgetary constraints drive changes in schedule and/or 
performance requirements that, in turn, have an unintended and negative impact on 
cost control.   
Some interview respondents thought that, as budgets “moved up” the 
organizational hierarchy, there was a tendency to overestimate dollars to get the correct 
amount of warfighting capability; they felt this resulted in budgets exceeding guidance.  
Some respondents also felt that the large and expensive weapons systems which were 
built over several congressional districts or states were, perhaps, not subjected to as 
searching a warfare analysis scrutiny as they should have been. Respondents were 
concerned that “leadership can and does direct funding for programs deemed important, 
yet not supported by the analysis, given the info available to mid-level experts” 
(Fierstine, 2004, p. 99). They also said the lack of time and insufficient data or expertise 
impacted the quality of the budget decisions that were made. Respondents also worried 
about the degree of overlap and churn in the system. We speculate further on this 
below.  
The military departments and services, the joint staff and OSD all do very similar 
analyses using the same data, models and simulations (and in some cases the same 
personnel). All of this adds time and manpower usage to the process without 
necessarily reducing the necessity for guesswork and intuition. With respect to 
transformation, respondents felt that the PPBES was still a work in progress and had 
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not produced a significant increase in benefits. We would observe the primary difficulty 
here is that the budgeters begin to work on the budget before a POM package has been 
completed; furthermore, the budget is constantly changing rather than having a fixed 
package after the programmers are through with their work. In addition, the work level 
increases while the timeline stays relatively fixed.  Further, in the budget and 
programming process, people routinely make decisions without a full grasp of all the 
facts and data. This was evident at all levels, from those in the program and 
requirements offices who had to route paperwork through people unfamiliar with their 
platform, to those in FMB making spot judgments due to time constraints. Finally, 
everyone interviewed complained about the length of time it takes to route paperwork 
and receive decisions. 
Respondents also worried that emergent needs were not identified and 
integrated into the system soon enough—in effect, that joint needs had priority, and 
some programs were identified as joint and given priority when the likelihood of their 
being used in a joint environment was low. They also criticized the cumbersome 
procedures necessary to gain approval in the JCS review process. Some of those 
interviewed expressed the view that some program and requirements officer emergent 
needs for existing programs are not adequately addressed in the current system. Most 
argued that a big part of the current problem is the fact that the comptrollers were tied to 
the exact terminology in the OSIPs; therefore, anything not specifically delineated in the 
OSIPs had to endure the lengthy delay of a new program start-up. They all complained 
about the difficulty of navigating through the vague joint requirements required of all 
communication gear; these requirements force them to route all associated programs 
and upgrades through numerous joint wickets, even though many of the programs 
would not be used in such a manner as to require the joint standard. Finally, a few 
interviewees took issue with the equitable distribution of funds in programs that took 
money from everyone in order to provide commonality to all platforms. They claimed 
that these funds were effectively an under-the-table system for certain airframes to get 
capability funded by everyone else.  
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Those interviewed explained that playing the game carefully is important. One 
interviewee had a list of the correct words to use when writing justification for dollars in 
different appropriations. Although a number of terms were virtually synonymous and 
would appear to mean approximately the same thing, a word that was wrong for the 
account could lead to a turndown or a do-over. For example, a careful analyst would 
use the terms “investigate or research” when writing justification for an RDT&E account, 
but use the terms “analyze or assess” when doing the same activity for an APN 
justification. And an O&M request using these words would be looked upon unfavorably. 
The word “track” is probably as close as the O&M accounts get to in depth analysis.  
Respondents were concerned with innovative adaptations to organizational 
stress. Here we point out how requirements change (downward) as programs fail to 
meet requirements; moreover we will illustrate how Program Managers have found that 
if they can move their programs to a multi-year profile, they can fend off much of the 
churn that is driven by the annual budget process, particularly one that takes place in an 
era of scarce resources. Programmers have begun to increasingly use multi-year 
procurement strategies in an attempt to fence off programs from the annual churn that is 
inevitable…breaking a MYP contract is a tremendously powerful argument for use in 
reclamas. The programmers also have used BTRs (Below Threshold Reprogramming) 
to their advantage to protect their accounts from raids during execution. This has the 
added benefit of cushioning them against the end of the year need to spend their money 
or lose it by designating the recipient of moneys unspent and then possibly getting 
reciprocation after the new budget comes along.  
Reflecting on the above research, we may observe that the most significant issue 
discovered during our research was that an overwhelming amount of redundancy exists 
at all levels of the chain of command. This finding is supported by a study by the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies warning, “that various military bureaucracies 
“unnecessarily overlap”, resulting in duplicative and, in some cases, overly large staffs 
that require wasteful coordination processes and impede necessary innovation” 
(Schmitt, 2004).   
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The research for this project found that almost every Secretary, Under Secretary, 
Assistant Secretary and Flag Officer with a required signature anywhere in these three 
decision-making processes has their own group of analysts to recheck, re-verify and 
recertify the data provided them from others (all of which are in or near the Pentagon).  
An example with regard to aviation would be how the individual programs, BFMs, N7, 
N8 and OSD all have cost-analysis experts on staff looking at the same data, yet 
coming up with different conclusions.  Although risk reduction is important, it seems that 
DoD analysis capability has grown (in aggregate) past the point of diminishing returns.  
The results of this research project call for an effort to reduce these 
redundancies. The authors also would like to see improved communication among the 
three processes and to suggest the creation of an information system to communicate 
(near) real-time, highly detailed, accurate and useful programmatic cost, schedule, and 
performance information to decision makers.  Included in this system should be highly 
detailed prioritization lists so that when decisions have to be made at subsequent levels 
of the budgeting process, those having to make those decisions can more adequately 
determine what should be cut when necessary, or what should be bought when there is 
extra funding available.  
We must add that this might increase decision speed since top leadership 
officials would be able to make decisions based on data in the system without having to 
drill back down into the program offices to get data that may or may not satisfy their 
needs. Our study indicates a need for simplifying the entire acquisition document-and-
review process, but makes no specific recommendation. We suggest that current 
operators are reducing the risk of making the wrong decision by increasing the time to 
make the decision.  We also worry that currently there is no satisfactory way to address 
ideas or concerns that “bubble up” from the fleet that would add small increases in 
capability in the near-term.  Currently this is divided between existing programs that 
require attention and emergent ideas that require immediate funding and could be 
fielded quickly and at low cost. An example of a less urgent nature includes F-14 
adaptation of the Air Force LANTERN pod.  This upgrade was on the community’s ”top-
ten upgrade list” for years, but was only able to get funding after a monumental 
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demonstration of fleet innovation. Had the acquisition pipeline been able to rapidly and 
cost-effectively address this need, then the fleet would not have been motivated to enter 
the process of test, evaluation and demonstration. Since changes like this are relatively 
small and tend to be focused on the short term versus the JCIDS horizon of decades, 
fleet operators are unable to enter the funding debate without great difficulty. We would 
argue that this item is a small but important thing to field users (in this case the fleets); it 
suggests a better system needs to be established that will allow the adequate 
prioritization and swift communication of these fleet concerns up the chain of command.  
We believe these ideas deserve further study. What may first be observed is that 
these recommendations call for reduction in staffs to eliminate redundancies, and also 
for the installation of a comprehensive real-time information system that would serve the 
same information to all participants; additionally, we urge the creation of a failure-
analysis unit and system. The risk here is that adding a new and complex information 
system and a new organizational entity to systems already rife with information systems 
and complexity is problematic. Additionally, the proposal to allow some systems to 
perform unique functions for specific military departments more quickly and in a more 
direct manner pushes against the joint and centralizing management trend currently in 
progress under transformation. Lastly, changes suggested here would be imposed on 
decision systems already undergoing substantial and continuous reform; in other words, 
these systems constitute moving targets. Any further changes would have to be made 
to systems that are already in the process of changing, and too much change at the 




Our findings relative to our primary research hypothesis, i.e., the degree of 
integration of the PPBES and Defense Acquisition System decision cycles, indicate 
there are some points at which substantial and reinforcing linkages exist, and others 
where the systems operate separately. The question is to what degree should parts that 
are not integrated presently be better integrated in the future? A key point in the PPBES 
(with respect to increased integration) that has been reinforced under the leadership of 
Secretary Rumsfeld is in the programming "endgame"—the last part of the 
programming phase of the PPBES. This is where the Senior Leadership Review Group 
established by the Secretary reviews, approves and sometimes is forced to cut major 
acquisition programs. In 2004 and 2005, the Secretary and the SLRG have had to 
consider both significant increases in acquisition and reductions forced by the tight fiscal 
constraints of POM 07 and the FY 2006 defense budget. The SLRG review, forced by 
the need to reduce spending projections due to the costs of the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) and other budgetary costs (including those for personnel and 
personnel entitlements programs), resulted in some major acquisition program shifts 
and reductions. These include approval of the Navy's decision to retire an aircraft carrier 
early (the Kennedy), cancellation of the C-130J buy and reductions in the size of buys in 
submarines and surface vessels for the Navy, modularization for the Army (the 
acquisition portion of this initiative), and cuts in the Joint Strike Fighter and the F/A-22 
aircraft program for the Air Force.  
In budget execution, the problems we have identified in this article remain as far 
as we can ascertain. This is an area where “the budget drives the program” to a great 
degree. Some of this is inevitable, e.g., as a result of congressional politics that produce 
changes in defense budgets and acquisition programs beyond the ability of the DoD to 
resist. When this ordering occurs, it causes significant disruption in the budget—both in 
preparation of future budgets and in the execution of current appropriations. It also 
forces changes in both the structure and content of the POM and QDR, causing the 
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programming process to have to move in reverse (to accommodate budget changes) in 
a way that almost always causes discontinuity in program management and execution. 
Overall, we conclude that, up to this point in time, under Secretary Rumsfeld a 
number of changes have been made to improve the manner in which the PPBES serves 
as a decision system for the DoD to better integrate financial decisions with acquisition 
decision making. This is, in part, a result of Rumsfeld's demand for better information 
upon which to base decisions and his willingness to listen carefully and to question 
vigorously the data and options provided to him from his staff. In addition, it is a result of 
the changes made in the PPBES to better connect the process to the Secretary's 
decision preferences. We also conclude that this linkage has been strengthened 
through program review by the JCS (J8) where not just defense-wide acquisition 
programs (as was the case before transformation of PPBES), but all DoD acquisition 
programs now are reviewed for jointness and feasibility.  
With respect to budget formulation as opposed to execution, the DoD comptroller 
staff holds the view that budgeting always has integrated acquisition programming. 
However, programmers do not share this view, contending that too many budget 
decisions have driven the POM rather than the other way around. This may have 
changed to some extent over the past four years, but there is insufficient evidence 
available to us to show a demonstrable change in how DoD budgeting operates now 
compared to prior to 2001. What we can document is that DoD budgeting has had to be 
highly responsive to changes in the threatening and warfighting environment in the past 
four years. 
In this regard, we might wonder what would happen to DoD resource decision 
making if the POM were eliminated and replaced by a process of longer-term budgeting. 
In traditional budgeting (as it is practiced in almost all jurisdictions in the US), 
budgeteers have to answer several important questions as they ascertain what they 
need in the budget and as they justify their requests to funding sources. These 
questions include “what,” “why,” “when,” “where,” and “how.” The answer to ”how much” 
flows from the answers to the prior questions. All of these questions are important, but 
 45 
possibly the two most important questions in this set are the ”what” and ”why” 
questions. They set the stage for the fact-finding that causes answers to the how, 
where, and when questions to surface. For example, if there is no need for a ship or a 
tank, then there is no need to define when you might need it, where you might need it, 
or how it might be configured or delivered. This interrogative pattern is the whole cloth 
upon which budget decisions are based. Much academic research has focused on the 
concept of incrementalism, i.e., that budgets change only by small amounts on the 
margin and not much as a percentage of the total from one year to the next. This is a 
tested analytic finding, but not one that is useful for the PPBES decision makers 
because they do not build budgets by focusing on percent of change. Rather, they first 
determine what it is they need (requirements). They do this by analyzing the world 
around them and its impact on the organization and its systems. They then establish 
what is needed to improve or operate more efficiently or effectively than in the previous 
planning period or fiscal year. Finally, they evaluate in detail what this will cost and what 
can be executed in the annual budget. 
With the implementation of the PPBS in 1964 under Robert McNamara, the 
defense budget system split the focus of these questions into three parts. The planning 
and programming functions (in which the SPG and POM are built) deal with the “what” 
and “why” questions, and to some extent “where” and “when.” Most of what is left for the 
budget process is the task of answering the question, “how much this year?” Still, 
budget formulators do have to present their fully justified budget to reviewers in the 
DoD, the OMB, and Congress. This means that they have to convey the part of the 
POM that answers the “how” and “what” questions along with the request for “how 
much.” To do this, budget offices have to put back together the pieces of the program 
that is built in different places for different purposes by different sponsors. Asking what 
the best profile for the ingredients for an aircraft carrier battle group over the next ten 
years (a planning and programming question) is different from asking how much is 
needed to operate the battle group for the next year. But in the PPBS, to decide ”how 
much,” the budgeters have to know what the total program will look like. 
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So long as there is clear articulation and separation of these processes and one 
feeds carefully into the other, this system can work—as long as the POM feeds 
information into the budget process. For the most part, budgeters may have been happy 
to have many of the big resource questions decided for them, leaving them to focus on 
pricing out next year’s needs. For their part, programmers have developed rules that 
allowed them to develop a good POM for each cycle. Usually, this means everyone gets 
something, but nobody gets everything they want. 
With the passage of time, dysfunctions appeared in this scenario. First, the 
military departments created POMs that were more conducive to their needs than to 
joint warfighting needs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms (1986) were intended to 
rectify this situation. Then, with the drawdown after the fall of the Soviet Union, budget 
offices were placed in the awkward position of having to make decisions because the 
calendar said it was time to do so—even when the POM had not been completed—
because those who built the POM could not decide which was the best way to downsize 
while maintaining the capacity to deter or fight future wars. Military department and DoD 
budget offices were, by and large, unhappy at having to make programmatic drawdown 
decisions under this circumstance. In the 1990s, and now in the last two years, the 
program decision-making process has not been completed in time to meet the needs of 
the budget. Most recently, this is allegedly due to the combined program- and budget-
review process under the PPBES. Various improvements have been made to the 
processes of planning and programming for weapons acquisition, but none has been 
fully successful. Perhaps the problem with the system is not with the acquisition 
process, but rather the overly complicated programming and budgeting process. 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has characterized the PPB process as too slow and too 
complicated. As part of his transformation effort, Rumsfeld changed PPB so that the 
programming and budgeting analysis and decision phases are roughly concurrent. The 
POM process begins first, but both the budget and the POM process are supposed to 
end at the same time. In effect, the failure of the programming system to reach 
decisions may be viewed as having broken the budget process. 
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In reality, the budget process can only reach the “how much” question by 
answering the ”what” and “why” questions. If the answers to these questions all appear 
at the same time, or when they are not answered at all, then the budget process has to, 
in effect, duplicate what is supposed to be done in the POM process to produce a 
budget on time. Indeed, under the new PPBES process, some parts of the budget 
process have had to operate as if there was no POM process. 
This leads to the question: is there/would there be a genuine need to prepare a 
POM, especially if budgeting were done on a longer-term basis of two to five years? 
Perhaps it would be useful to take the transformation PPBES reform one step further 
and discard the separate POM process by simply incorporating the POM questions and 
POM process outputs into the budget process? This is a more sizeable task than it 
appears due to the existence of a bureaucracy which produces the POM. Conversely, it 
is perhaps a less sizeable task than it seems because the military staff involved in the 
POM process have other career lines and can perform functions as warfighters, and/or 
players in the defense-acquisition process or the warfare-requirements-setting system. 
There would be some civilian positions, mainly those in the Pentagon, that would 
disappear in this new integrated POM/budget cycle—a cycle that could perhaps be 
called the planning, budgeting and execution system (PBES). 
While creating a two-phase planning and budgeting system would rationalize the 
operation of PBE within the DoD, a useful further step would be to create a longer-term 
appropriation period. DoD fiscal execution patterns are needlessly complicated by the 
rush to spend one-year appropriations before the close of the fiscal year. And the 
mixing of different appropriation periods for different appropriations needlessly 
complicates administration for those who execute budgets. Most of the DoD budget 
functions on a multi-year pattern—longer for military construction and procurement of 
long-lived assets such as ships and aircraft, and shorter for personnel and supporting 
expenses (O&M). However, even if personnel is legally an annual appropriation, in 
reality the force size and composition is relatively fixed and will remain so until some 
external crisis event forces review and change. Personnel could as well be a two-, 
three-, of even five-year appropriation. We suggest that the DoD budget is, in effect, a 
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multiple-year budget now. It would make sense to recognize it as such and to 
appropriate for multiple-year periods for all accounts, and to extend the obligation period 
for short-term accounts beyond one year at minimum.  
A two-year appropriation (or obligation period) for personnel and O&M would be 
a useful starting point for Congress. Critics of such an approach often point to 
Congress’s need to exercise oversight through the budget. But Congress can exercise 
whatever oversight it cares to in various ways, for example by focusing on execution 
review in off-budget years in a two-year cycle. A two-year budget also would reduce the 
opportunity for Congress and the President to insert what all recognize as “pork” into 
defense appropriations.  The suggestions we make here would reduce opportunities for 
pork, but would also allow for meaningful oversight by Congress, and would reduce the 
size of the Pentagon bureaucracy while releasing some military officers for duty in their 
warfare specialties.  
Moving to our primary area of interest in this article, given the above and other 
reservations made in this article, we cannot at present paint a rosy picture of our results 
of transformation of budgeting for acquisition. We observe that at the program and 
project-management level (within budget execution from the financial management 
perspective), there remains a high level of uncertainty regarding financial stability and 
management control. While macro changes at the DoD level may make participants in 
the OSD believe that the system has been changed (and they probably are right with 
respect to their position perspective), the larger question remains whether macro 
system changes have improved the cost, performance, speed of delivery of weapons 
and weapons systems in reality. This improvement will only result from better 
management and management control at the point of relationship of the buyer (DoD) 
and the supplier (the private-sector contractors). It is evident from preliminary analysis 
(and from the experience-based knowledge of serving and retired program and project 
managers) that there still is much to be improved in the nature of contracting, contract 
management, and enforcement of DoD and government controls through a properly 
designed and enforced management control system (Jones & Thompson, 1994).  
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The dilemma is, in part, a result of management failure on the part of government 
in assuming that private-sector contractors will obey DoD and federal acquisition rules 
and guidelines and the restrictions built into contracts, without sufficient DoD leadership, 
oversight, and enforcement of law and contracts. Is the blame for project-cost overruns 
the fault of greedy contractors that attempt to take advantage of government 
incompetence or lax enforcement? Is the blame due to this absence of control on the 
part of the DoD? It appears that both are causes of the problems of costs exceeding 
estimates, the extended time taken to develop and deliver new and increasingly more 
technologically complex weapons systems, late delivery, system failures (despite 
higher-than-projected costs), inadequate documentation provided for training of end-
users, installation deficiencies and many other problems with the quality and 
performance of systems delivered to the fighting forces. 
Our point is that it is unwise and incorrect to gloat about or claim victory in the 
battle to make acquisition and its funding more efficient at the top levels of the 
Pentagon, when at the level at which programs and projects must be managed so little 
has changed to achieve the improved efficiency and effectiveness goals of 
transformation. No amount of change at the Pentagon level will achieve these goals. To 
bring meaningful reform, change must reach down to the level at which spending occurs 
and programs are executed, where the government and contractor interface and 
relationships are so crucial to improving performance and results. 
How can the process of transformation reach down to the program and project 
level? Some may argue that a great deal of effort has been exerted toward deregulating 
and contracting out, much to the benefit of the DoD (generally) and acquisition 
(specifically).  That deregulation (e.g., of the FAR and DAR, the DoD 5000 series, etc.) 
has been a focus is undeniable. However, the attempts to improve management of 
acquisition programs at the government/contractor interface have concentrated on 
auditing. The problem with this approach is that of closing the barn door after the horses 
have escaped. It is fine to discover contractor overcharging ex ante and to extract 
penalty payments from contractors as a result. However, this is merely a financial 
transaction that does little or nothing to improve the services to and benefits of the end-
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user—the warfighter. When unworkable products are manufactured and delivered, no 
matter what the cost to government, the result for the end-user ranges from frustration 
in the best of circumstances to casualties and death under the worst of circumstances.  
It may be argued that what is needed is not more deregulation but adequate level 
of effort in enforcing the rules that are in place, which can only happen through high-
quality, knowledgeable and skilled leadership. This, in turn, implies investment in the 
education of leaders and decision makers, better selection of those properly prepared to 
lead, increased continuity of leadership and the ability to manage looking forward rather 
than backward in the manner that characterizes the "reform by audit" mentality. Who 
advanced the conclusion that auditors would be the best source of the management 
knowledge and expertise needed to improve business practice? Even the audit 
community itself would not advance this proposition. So, where do we go from here? 
We believe the knowledge about how to improve acquisition management at the ground 
level resides, to a great extent, with those who have done the job, i.e., experienced (and 
typically retired) program and project managers. If this were not the case, then why 
would the private sector hire and pay these people so well to represent them in dealing 
with the DoD? The question of leadership in ground-level transformation, where it will 
make the most difference for the end-user, thus becomes how to retain this expertise 
rather than force it into retirement to engage in profit generation for contractors?  
In addition, improvement in the nature of contracting instrumentation is vital—and 
much effort has gone into this initiative in the past several decades. As a colleague 
remarked, "What kind of cost-plus contract haven't we tried to create the right incentives 
to perform and deliver the results? We have tried them all!"  We would suggest that it is 
one thing to write a good and enforceable contract and another to actually enforce it. 
Learning how to do this is one obstacle; getting the attention of a revolving crew of 
leadership to either do it or permit it to be done is another. Our hope is that pointing out 
that improved management and control is a start to moving in the right direction (to be 
realized through adopting the appropriate control system design and execution strategy) 
and should be a prime target for transformation—equally worthy to the reformulation of 
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the PPBE system—will bring reform home to the level where it matters most (Thompson 
& Jones, 1994; Jones & McCaffery, 2005, forthcoming). 
With respect to the continuing pace of transformation throughout the DoD, no 
Secretary of Defense can alone manage an enterprise as complex as the Department of 
Defense. And in fact, it is important to point out that in the past and presently, input to 
program and budget decisions in the DoD is provided by the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense and staff, the position in the DoD that bears a large part of the responsibility for 
actually attempting to manage the DoD. In addition, the Under Secretary Comptroller, 
the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, Logistics, and Assistant Secretaries 
for other OSD functional areas including program analysis and evaluation, policy, force 
management and personnel, legislative affairs, health, reserve affairs and others, all 
provide views and analyses to guide program and budget decision making.  
From this perspective, it must be observed that the task of defense resource 
planning and budgeting is part managerial and part political. Thus, from our perspective, 
no amount of budget process, PPBES or business process transformation reforms will 
reconcile the different value systems and funding priorities for national defense and 
security represented by opposing political parties, nor will it eliminate the budgetary 
influence of special-interest politics. Value conflict was evident in the early 1980s when 
public support, combined with strong Presidential will and successful budget strategy, 
produced unprecedented peacetime growth in the defense budget, in particular in the 
investment accounts. And despite the implementation of deficit-control reforms since 
1985 and the Peace Dividend drawdown of the 1990s, constituent and special-interest 
pressures made it difficult for Congress and the DoD to realign the defense budget. 
While we applaud the changes made in 2001-2004, reform of defense budgeting 
process does not mean that producing a budget for national defense politically will be 
much easier in the future than it has been in the past. Threat perception and 
assessment and politics drive the defense budget, not the budget process itself 
(McCaffery & Jones, 2004). Additionally, the size of the deficit and rate of increase in 
mandatory expenditures make top-line financial relief for the DoD unlikely. 
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We also may observe that a sequence of annual budget increases for national 
defense in the early and mid-2000s have not brought relief to many accounts within the 
DoD budget. At the same time, requirements of fighting the War on Terrorism have 
intensified the use of DoD assets and the costs of military operations. Because the need 
for major asset renewal has been postponed for too long, new appropriations have gone 
(and will go in the future) largely to pay for new weapons system acquisition, and for 
war fighting in battles against terrorism. What this means is that accounts such as those 
for Operations and Maintenance for all branches of the armed services will continue to 
be under pressure and budget instability; restraint will remain a way of life for much of 
the DoD. This places a heavy burden on DoD leadership, analysts and resource-
process participants to achieve balance in all phases of defense budgeting and 
resource management.  
We may observe, in conclusion, that numerous transformation initiatives beyond 
improved financial management, PPBES and acquisition process reforms are in 
progress. In the areas of acquisition and logistics, transformation to spiral (continuous 
and simultaneous) and "sense and respond logistics" processes is underway. Improving 
information technology for management of inventory systems in real time to permit 
managers to know how much and where material is located on a worldwide basis also 
has been addressed and is fully operational in the Air Force. In the area of information 
technology, network-centric combat information systems are under development in all of 
the military services. Such systems coordinate various types of data to a single 
command point in real time to improve the ability to see and manage military operations. 
Applications of network-centric IT in the area of business management may be the next 
steps, although they are costly. However, such applications are one approach to 
coordination of decision making in flatter, network-types of organization (i. e., 
hyperarchies), rather than through traditional bureaucratic forms of organizing to solve 
complex and sometimes "wicked" problems (Jones & Thompson, 1999; Roberts, 2000). 
Given the vital importance of information technology, it is essential for the DoD to 
address the knowledge, skills and abilities of its workforce to fully leverage the potential 
of IT and other business-management methods. 
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These and the other initiatives identified in this article are only a sample of the 
many transformational measures currently under some degree of implementation and 
experimentation in the DoD. Given the progression from the industrial age to the age of 
technology in an increasingly global commercial marketplace, capitalization on new 
technologies is a key part of transformation to create "knowledge warriors" for 
significant battlefield advantage. Most of these initiatives are not under implementation 
independent of budgets and cost accountability—virtually all are expected to reduce 
costs while cutting cycle time with either improvement of quality or, at least, no 
diminution of quality of service to customers. The business models and plans developed 
for these initiatives are mirrored on business processes tested and used in the private 
sector. Transformation also stresses continuous learning and the creation of self-
learning organizations that can observe and orient themselves more quickly to new 
threat environments; they must then make decisions and take action to learn more 
quickly by trial-and-error in a cycle of restructuring, reengineering, reinvention, 
realignment and rethinking both means and objectives (Jones & Thompson, 1999). 
Further, critical issues related to transition management, organizational change, 
organizational design and appropriate institutional arrangements are raised whenever 
DoD reform is significant. 
Overall, the major challenge facing the DoD in the period 2004-2008 and beyond 
is how to continue to modernize the fighting forces and continue the pace of business 
transformation while paying the high price of waging the War on Terrorism. In essence, 
what the DoD must fund and support in the short-term must be traded-off against 
longer-term investments to improve both business-management efficiency and force 
readiness. Given this dilemma, it is clear that DoD leadership faces severe challenges 
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